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This paper aims to investigate firm-level variations in the extent of mandatory disclosures and 
address the drivers of mandatory disclosure using data from the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) region. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is examined using a disclosure index created with reference 
to 24 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs).  
Findings 
We find that the extent of mandatory disclosure required by applicable IFRSs/IASs increases 
with international presence, group firms, the level of voluntary disclosure, firm age, and the 
education level of company financial controllers. It decreases with firm size and the proportion 
of institutional share ownership. The degree of board independence is positively related to the 
level of mandatory disclosure in firms with no state ownership. Profitability positively affects 
the level of mandatory disclosure to a greater extent in more liquid GCC firms. Our results 
confirm that there is greater sensitivity of mandatory disclosure to loss than to profit. Loss 
increases, while profit decreases, the extent of mandatory disclosure.  
Originality/value 
We develop a highly granular mandatory disclosure index in a developing country setting and 
identify key drivers of such disclosure. 
Research limitation/implications 
Our results promote further understanding of international financial reporting differences in an 
emerging country setting. 
Practical implications 
Our findings provide a detailed insight to investors, financial analysts, practitioners, and 
academics. 
 








Over the last two decades, there has been considerable interest in the drivers of mandatory 
disclosure, though studies largely focus on developed nation firms, limiting the generalisation 
of results to emerging countries. However, emerging countries may present a distinctive case 
as they may be characterised by differences in: familiarity with accounting standards and by 
language barriers (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003); governance practices (Aguilera and 
Cuervo Cazurra, 2009; Abdallah and Ismail, 2017), ownership structures (Abdallah and Ismail, 
2017); and cultural factors (education) (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). This paper aims to examine 
the impact of firm-specific characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate governance 
factors, and cultural factors on mandatory disclosure in emerging economy listed firms from 
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) region. Such firms seek to attract funds from national or 
even global markets and decide whether to disclose more or less information (Meek et al., 
1995). While complying with mandatory disclosure requirements and/or releasing additional 
voluntary information may be beneficial to the firm, the quality and quantity of information 
released may still be varied (Schuster and O’Connell, 2006).  
   Our study is motivated first of all by the extent of mandatory disclosure in GCC country 
listed firms following IASs/IFRSs adoption. Second, the GCC region is a rapidly growing 
economy and presents an attractive destination for investors. Between 2010 and 2019 the GCC 
region’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 3.45% (compared to an average annual global 
growth rate of 2.96% over the same period), and it generated a GDP of $1.6 trillion in 2019 
(World Bank WDI Database). Despite the GCC countries achieving Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) inflows to the region of below 2% of GDP in recent years, the region realised FDI inflows 
of 2.46% of GDP on average between 2010-13 (World Bank WDI database). Third, ownership 
concentration in the GCC region is relatively high, with large government stakes in particular 
(Abdallah and Ismail, 2017), thereby providing a good opportunity to understand the effects of 
state ownership and its interaction with board independence on their effect on the extent of 
mandatory disclosure.  
   Our paper provides several important contributions. First, it investigates the extent of 
mandatory disclosures and addresses the drivers of mandatory disclosure in GCC country listed 
firms, which should be of interest to researchers wishing to understand how mandatory 
disclosure has evolved and to identify those factors explaining differences across the region. 
Second, it provides a great insight for investors who consider making investments in the GCC 
region by identifying those factors that affect the extent of mandatory disclosure. Third, this 
study represents some useful guidance for GCC state enforcement bodies who will need to 
understand where variations occur in mandatory disclosures, particularly in cases of lower 
disclosure, as will the Gulf Co-Operation Council Accounting and Auditing Organization 
(GCCAAO) with its aim of harmonizing accounting standards across the region. Fourth, our 
results also examine the case of loss-making firms in GCC countries, which is an area not 
focused on in prior mandatory disclosure studies. Fifth, our results provide a useful insight into 
governance reforms, particularly regarding the relationship between corporate governance and 
disclosure practices which is an area identified for improvement in GCC countries 
(International Monetary Fund, 2018). 
   Our results show that mandatory disclosure increases with firm international presence, age, 
voluntary disclosure, and financial controller education level. Further, holding firms provide 
greater disclosure than individual firms. Board independence also drives more mandatory 
disclosure in firms with no strong state ownership. However, board independence decreases 
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the extent of disclosure in firms with strong state ownership. Further, mandatory disclosure is 
impaired where firms have relatively high institutional share ownership and in larger firms. 
CEO role duality has a weak negative effect on mandatory disclosure. Our results show that 
greater loss leads firms to disclose more mandatory information whereas greater profit leads to 
the opposite, implying that GCC firms become more relaxed in the provision of more detailed 
information when they earn greater profits. Our study also confirms that the sensitivity of 
mandatory disclosure to loss is nearly nine times greater than that to profit, implying that profit-
making firms disclose less than loss-making firms. In general, liquidity has no effect on 
mandatory disclosure, though highly profitable firms which are more liquid tend to disclose 
more. These results therefore suggest that GCC firms disclose more when they are financially 
stronger, have greater management experience and expertise, and are more international in 
scope.  
   Our findings will be of interest to current and potential investors in GCC country listed firms, 
as well as providing the IASB with a useful perspective on the extent and drivers of mandatory 
disclosure in a developing country setting. 
   Where it applies, disclosure for an item is mandatory if it must be reported in the financial 
statements of firms in accordance with legal or financial reporting requirements. Extant 
mandatory disclosure research focusing on developed countries such as the US, UK and 
European countries is well developed (Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003). Our 
study extends analysis to a developing (GCC) country setting. It contributes to existing 
knowledge as: (i) we develop a highly granular mandatory disclosure index, which should 
provide detailed insight to investors, financial analysts, practitioners, and academics wishing 
to understand disclosure in GCC country listed firms; and (ii) we identify key drivers of such 
disclosure. 
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the financial reporting 
environment for GCC country firms. Section 3 discusses the existing literature and discusses 
our hypothesis development. Section 4 describes the data and empirical models employed, and 
Section 5 discusses our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 summarises and draws some 
conclusions. 
 
2. The GCC country corporate financial reporting environment 
 
Within GCC countries, company law and security market law regulate corporate financial 
reporting, while financial reporting legislation protects financial report users. While GCC state 
company law sets out general reporting principles, it does not specify statement format or 
content, except for the minimum requirement for a balance sheet and a profit and loss 
statement. Governments control the accounting and auditing profession and regulate financial 
reporting regulations. Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have professional 
accounting bodies, though such bodies do not regulate accountants and auditors, establish 
accounting and auditing standards, or engage in enforcement (Shuaib, 1999; Al-Basteki, 2000). 
However, in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
issues accounting and auditing standards and certifies public accountants (SOCPA, 2020). 
   GCC country governments have adopted IASs and IFRSs in response to domestic and 
international financial market demand for greater financial reporting comparability (Hussain et 
al., 2002; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003). In Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain, the respective Ministries 
of Commerce require listed firms to comply with IASs, while in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the 
UAE, financial firms are required by central banks to comply with national GAAP or IFRSs.  
In Saudi Arabia, from 2017 all listed firms were required to report using the "national standards 




3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Disclosure is mandatory where firm information results from mandated accounting standards 
and regulations. Where enforcement is inefficient, the level of mandatory disclosure depends 
largely on manager discretion and may therefore be similar to the level of voluntary disclosure, 
particularly as the costs of provision may be similar. The level of mandatory disclosure is 
driven by supply and demand, regulatory risk borne by managers, and by country level 
regulatory and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework for both mandatory and voluntary disclosure is similar, and draws 
upon agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, political cost theory, and cultural 
theories as discussed in prior studies (such as Wallace et al. 1994; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Aljifri, 2008; Von Alberti-
Alhtaybat et al., 2012). 
      Agency theory concerns the relationship between agents (managers) and principals 
(shareholders) whereby the two parties tend to act in their own interests, and the separation of 
interests may cause conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morris, 1987). The theory suggests 
that disclosure may be used to reduce the information asymmetry and agency costs that arise 
between the parties. Signalling theory is concerned with the problems relating to information 
asymmetries in markets and illustrates how these asymmetries can be reduced by the party with 
more information by signalling it to others (Morris, 1987). Capital need theory hypothesises 
that a primary motivation for firm disclosure is the need for increasing capital at the lowest 
cost, leading in turn to an expectation for the firm to disclose more (Choi, 1973; Cooke, 1993; 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003). Political cost theory may provide additional theoretical 
underpinning to explain the level of mandatory disclosures. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
argue that large firms are more visible and therefore the level of political costs is influenced by 
firm size. To avoid the political costs, larger firms in the GCC region may increase the extent 
of mandatory disclosure as argued by Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, (2003) that the impact of 
disclosure of proprietary information on larger firms is less likely. Finally, Gray (1988) 
examines the relationship between culture and the accounting system with a reference to the 
cultural patterns proposed by Hofstede (1980) and suggests that education is one of the key 
institutional consequences of accounting values and systems. In our paper, we focus on the 
education element as a measure of a professional status (Grace, 1995) to examine its interaction 
with the extent of mandatory disclosure in the GCC context. In the following sections, we 
discuss the drivers of mandatory disclosures and develop our hypotheses with reference to prior 
studies.  
 
3.2. Mandatory disclosure indices  
 
In common with other areas of accounting research, much of the financial disclosure literature 
focuses on developed countries, and in particular the US and the UK, with a paucity of studies 
for developing countries. Existing studies for the US and UK include Barrett (1976), Malone 
et al. (1993), and Street and Gray (2002), and for France include Barrett (1976) and Zarzeski 
(1996). Firm sample sizes for the developed country studies are relatively high compared to 
those for developing countries due to data collection and database limitations, and a culture of 
corporate secrecy in the latter (Hassan et al., 2006). In the case of developing country studies, 
there is significant variation in the quality of mandatory disclosure indices employed, due in 
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part to the absence of a theoretical basis for determining index size and scope, with component 
item counts ranging from 20 (Agyei-Mensah, 2013) to 641 (Al-Akra et al., 2010a).  
   Unweighted disclosure indices, which reflect the demands of different financial statement 
users regarding the relative importance of various information items, are prevalent in the 
developed country literature. On this basis, Abd-Elsalam  and Weetman (2007) apply an index 
of 241 mandatory items required by the Companies Act, Capital Market Law and IASs in Egypt 
and find average mandatory disclosure levels of 92%, 73% and 76%, respectively. Alanezi and 
Albuloushi (2011) and Alfraih (2016) apply indices of 199 and 439 items based on 18 IASs 
and 26 IASs/IFRSs, and find average disclosure levels of 72% and 70%, respectively. Naser 
and Nuseibeh (2003) apply both weighted and unweighted indices for 56 mandatory items and 
find average disclosure levels of 89% in each case.  
   Furthermore, many studies apply customised disclosure indices relevant and applicable to a 
country’s environment (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Alfraih, 2016), while Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman (2007) and Dahawy (2009) apply existing indices used by bodies such as the 
Egyptian Capital Market Authority. Importantly, IAS/IFRS adoption does not necessarily lead 
to greater mandatory disclosure as this depends both on a country’s financial reporting system 
(Craig and Diga, 1998; Tower et al., 1999; Al-Shammari et al., 2008) and firm manager 
implementation even where compliance is required (Touron, 2005).  
   Perusal of the literature reveals that mandatory disclosure in developing countries is far lower 
than that in developed countries, with index scores as low as 44% for Bangladesh 
(Akhtaruddin, 2005) and 54% for Egypt (Dahawy, 2009) compared to 93% for New Zealand 
(Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). Further, due to data availability and sample size limitations, 
developing country studies are typically smaller. Mandatory disclosure studies for developing 
countries include Saudi Arabia (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003), Egypt (Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2007; Dahawy and Conover, 2007) and GCC countries (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). 
The most comprehensive mandatory disclosure index of 641 items is developed by Al-Akra et 
al. (2010a) and uses the PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) checklist. In general, developing 
country studies reach similar conclusions to those found for developed countries. However, 
developing country firms often do not comply fully with IAS disclosure requirements, with 
disclosure levels very rarely close to, or exceeding 90%, and the majority of studies reporting 
disclosure levels ranging from 60% to 70%.  
 
3.3. Mandatory disclosure determinants and hypothesis development 
In this section, we develop hypotheses for the relationship between firm mandatory disclosure 
and its potential determinants in relation to firm characteristics, ownership structure, corporate 
governance, and corporate cultural factors.  
 
3.3.1. Firm characteristics 
 
Inchausti (1997) employs an agency and signalling theories approach and argues that managers 
with ‘good news’ in terms of performance disclose more detailed information than when they 
have ‘bad news’ to prevent share undervaluation. However, evidence on the relationship 
between mandatory disclosure and firm profitability is mixed. A positive relationship is found 
by Ali et al. (2004) for firms in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and for Australian firms by 
Gallery et al. (2008). In contrast, no relation is found by Street and Gray (2001) for the US, 
Glaum and Street (2003) for Germany, Al-Shammari et al. (2008) for GCC countries, or 
Popova et al. (2013) for the UK, while Wallace and Naser (1995) find a negative relationship 
for Hong Kong. Based on the mixed evidence, we argue that firm performance is a key 
instrument to determine the extent of mandatory disclosure. Theory and empirical studies show 
6 
 
that profitability could increase, decrease, or have no effect on the level of mandatory 
disclosures. Further, it is argued that legal actions against inadequate disclosures can encourage 
firm management to increase voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). We argue that 
negative firm profitability (loss) can lead firms to disclose additional information because 
managers of loss-making firms are expected to justify their operating results and may also be 
more sensitive to investor legal action. Therefore, we expect that the sensitivity of mandatory 
disclosure in GCC firms is greater to loss than to profit. We therefore develop the broad 
hypothesis that: 
 
H1: The extent of mandatory disclosure is influenced by firm profitability.  
 
   Agency theory arguments suggest that firms with lower liquidity will wish to reassure 
investors and lenders by disclosing more information, particularly in relation to their ability to 
meet short-term obligations without liquidating long-term assets or interrupting operations 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995). However, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) make the signalling theory 
argument that managers of more liquid firms will disclose more to distinguish themselves from 
less liquid firms (Oyelere et al., 2003; Aly et al., 2010). 
   There is mixed evidence on the relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and 
liquidity. A negative relationship is found by Wallace et al. (1994) for Spanish firms, Naser et 
al. (2002) for Jordanian firms, and Ismail et al. (2010) for Egyptian firms. In contrast, a positive 
relationship is found by Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) for Canadian firms and Al-Akra et al. 
(2010b) for Jordanian firms. However, no relationship is found by Wallace and Naser (1995) 
for Hong Kong firms, Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) for New Zealand firms, Aljifri (2008) 
for UAE firms, and Hassan (2013) for Jordanian firms. 
   Consistent with signalling theory, we expect that more liquid GCC firms will disclose more 
financial information in order to distinguish themselves from other firms. We also argue that 
more liquid firms tend to be more profitable because of lower finance costs and more efficient 
working capital management. Thus, managers of more profitable and liquid firms will be 
motivated to disclose more. We expect that the effect of firm profitability on mandatory 
disclosure is positively influenced by firm liquidity. We therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H2a: Firm liquidity positively impacts the level of mandatory disclosure.  
H2b: The interaction relationship between a firm's liquidity and its profitability significantly 
impacts the level of mandatory disclosure. 
 
   Daske et al. (2013) and Amiraslani et al. (2013) argue that the level of disclosure is positively 
related to the degree of international exposure or activity, as gauged by foreign market listing, 
foreign sales, or the presence of foreign investors, though there exists mixed evidence on this 
relationship. Glaum and Street (2003) find that firms cross-listing on US exchanges disclose 
more while no relationship is found by Malone et al. (1993) and Street and Gray (2001) for US 
firms and Ismail et al. (2010) for Egyptian firms.    
   For GCC country firms, it is expected that firms more heavily engaged in international 
activities will engage more with mandatory disclosure requirements than firms with a more 
domestic market focus. We therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H3: There is a significant positive impact of the degree of international activity (sales) on the 
extent of mandatory disclosure.  
 
   Globalisation and greater financial reporting awareness by current and potential investors 
have led to increased demand for quality financial information and disclosure. Whereas 
7 
 
mandatory disclosure is the responsibility of regulatory organisations (security exchange 
authorities, IASB, FASB), voluntary disclosure is at the discretion of firm managers and driven 
by their interests (Akhtaruddin, 2005). Mandatory and voluntary disclosure interrelate and 
interact, whereby mandatory disclosure is an obligation to disclose a minimum amount of 
reporting information (Wallace and Naser, 1995) while voluntary disclosure is the provision of 
additional information on firm value and performance. Where mandatory disclosure proves 
imperfect in meeting investor expectations, managers employ voluntary disclosure as an 
additional tool (Graham et al., 2005) to communicate their superior knowledge of company 
performance (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Dye (1985, 1986) argues that where the two disclosure 
types are substitutes (complements), then greater disclosure requirements will reduce 
(increase) voluntary disclosure. Noh et al. (2019) investigate the link between firms’ voluntary 
guidance and mandatory 8K filings and find a negative relationship, implying the two 
disclosures are substitutes and emphasising that the link between them likely depends on the 
specific content and disclosure attributes being considered. However, Ball et al. (2012) 
examine the relationship between audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of 
managers’ private information and suggest that they are complementary mechanisms for 
communicating with investors. Naser et al. (2003) find that voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures are equally important to Kuwaiti stakeholders, whereas Gigler and Hemmer (1998) 
find that increasing mandatory disclosures may eliminate voluntary disclosures. Al-Razeen and 
Karbhari (2004) find no interaction for Saudi firms.  
   We argue that mandatory and voluntary disclosure are complements for GCC firms as we 
consider that private information disclosure is uninformative as a stand-alone mechanism (Ball 
et al., 2012), and therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H4: There is a significant positive impact of the extent of voluntary disclosure on the extent of 
mandatory disclosure. 
 
Firms may apply IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements to an earlier accounting period, 
though in so doing they must disclose the fact that they have early-adopted the standard, and 
they may also apply IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements, IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other 
Entities, IAS 27 Separate Financial Statements, and IAS 28 Investments in Associates and 
Joint Ventures. Therefore, firms producing consolidated financial statements are expected to 
comply with more accounting standards and disclose more. However, while we expect firms 
producing consolidated financial statements to have a higher level of mandatory disclosure, 
there exists no evidence on this relationship, thereby supporting the need for further 
investigation. We therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H5: Firms producing consolidated financial statements are expected to have a higher level of 
mandatory disclosure. 
 
The degree of mandatory disclosure may be associated with a firm’s length of establishment 
(age), though evidence on this relationship is mixed. For example, Popova et al. (2013) find a 
positive relationship, whereas Glaum and Street (2003), Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) and 
Al-Sammari et al. (2008) find no relationship. It is expected that older GCC firms will be more 
likely to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements than younger firms as: (i) the former 
will have stronger accounting systems and more qualified and experienced staff, leading to 
increased gathering, processing and dissemination of the information supporting mandatory 
disclosure requirements; and (ii) the latter may suffer greater competitive disadvantage by 
disclosing information on research and development expenditure, capital expenditure and new 




H6: There is a significant positive impact of firm age on the extent of mandatory disclosure. 
 
The evidence on the relationship between firm size and the extent of mandatory disclosure is 
mixed. Al-Shammari et al. (2008) and Al Mutawaa and Hewaidy (2010) find a positive 
relationship, while Street and Bryant (2000) and Glaum and Street (2003) find no evidence. In 
theory, however, firms benefit from greater disclosure which potentially leads to lower 
political, capital, proprietary and direct costs, and thus larger firms are likely to disclose more. 
We therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H7: There is a significant positive impact of firm size on the level of mandatory disclosure. 
 
3.3.2. Ownership structure factors 
In GCC countries, government agencies, institutional investors, and dominant families 
typically maintain substantial listed firm equity ownership, and thereby will influence the level 
and quality of disclosure. They are ‘insiders’ as they typically have board representation and 
better access to internal information, thus requiring lower disclosure. Evidence on the insider 
effect for institutional investors is observed for Saudi Arabia (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003), 
Kuwait (Al-Shimmiri, 2003) and Bahrain (Al-Bastaki, 1997). However, government 
ownership may exert a different impact to institutional ownership due to high political costs. 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2007) find that increased government ownership leads to greater 
IAS mandatory disclosure in Egyptian firms, Hassan (2013) finds lower IFRS mandatory 
disclosure as public ownership increases, while no relationship is found by Wallace and Naser 
(1995) for Hong Kong firms and by Naser et al. (2002) and Hassan (2013) for Jordanian firms. 
Further, neither Shammari et al. (2008) nor Al-Akra et al. (2010b) find a relationship between 
disclosure and institutional ownership for GCC country firms and Jordanian firms, 
respectively. 
   In our paper, we gauge the impact of government ownership and institutional ownership to 
examine ownership diffusion separately. Agency theory suggests that firms with institutional 
ownership have less incentive to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements while the 
opposite is true for firms with government ownership due to political sensitivity. We therefore 
hypothesise that: 
 
H8: Firms with greater institutional ownership produce a lower level of mandatory disclosure. 
 
H9: Firms with greater government ownership produce a higher level of mandatory disclosure. 
 
3.3.3. Corporate governance factors  
 
Larger boards facilitate better monitoring and strategic decision making, while allowing for 
greater diversity and financial reporting expertise (Singh et al., 2004; Laksmana, 2008). 
Rahman and Ali (2006) find that larger boards lead to lower earnings management and higher 
mandatory disclosure and disclosure quality. Al-Akra et al. (2010b) find a positive relation for 
Jordanian firms, while Hasan et al. (2013) find no relationship for Bangladeshi firms. We 
therefore expect that: 
 




Agency and resource dependency theories suggest that greater board independence should lead 
to greater monitoring of management and better financial disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Lim et al. (2007) argue that non-executive directors 
provide a linking mechanism between the firm and its external environment, as well as 
monitoring management performance and reducing manager-owner information asymmetry. 
Many studies find a positive relationship. Ezat and El-Masry (2008) find a positive relationship 
between the degree of board independence and reporting in Egyptian firms, while Verriest et 
al. (2013) find a positive relation with information quality in European firms. However, other 
studies find no relationship (Hassan, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014). 
   While there is little empirical evidence for GCC countries, the literature in general supports 
a positive relationship as greater independence promotes board monitoring, transparency, and 
disclosure. We also argue that state ownership moderates the relationship between board 
independence and mandatory disclosure and expect in a firm controlled by government that 
independent board members may be influenced more by their personal relationships with 
government representatives (Dahya et al., 2008), and in turn the level of mandatory disclosure 
is impaired (Chen and Jaggi,2000). Therefore, we introduce an additional interaction effect. 
We hypothesise that: 
 
H11a: The level of mandatory disclosure is significantly affected by board independence. 
H11b: The interaction relationship between board independence and state ownership 
negatively impacts the extent of mandatory disclosure. 
 
   Role duality describes when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the Chair, the former 
responsible for setting and implementing firm strategies and managing operations, while the 
latter has responsibility for ensuring board effectiveness (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005). Agency 
theory suggests that role separation improves management efficiency and provides checks and 
balances on management performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), also limiting CEO power 
concentration (Kelton and Yang, 2008). However, Eisenhardt (1989) and Stewart (1991) argue 
that role duality allows a sharper focus on firm objectives and promotes faster implementation 
of operational decisions, and that CEO duality reduces voluntary disclosures (Gul and Leung, 
2004). Alfraih (2016) finds a negative relationship between IFRS disclosure and role duality 
for Kuwaiti firms, while Gao and Kling (2012) find a positive relationship for Chinese firms. 
Despite mixed evidence on the impact of duality on disclosure, the theory in general supports 
a negative relationship (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). We therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H12: Role duality negatively impacts the level of mandatory disclosure in GCC firms. 
 
3.3.4. Cultural characteristics 
Gray (1988) identifies education as a key driver of accounting values and practices, and Grace 
et al. (1995) argue that director educational level is a useful measure of professional status. 
Wallace and Cooke (1990) argue that higher education levels lead to greater political awareness 
and demand for corporate accountability. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) hypothesise a positive 
relationship between the proportion of business or accounting qualified directors and the extent 
of voluntary disclosures but find no relationship. We argue that more relevant educational 
backgrounds should lead to both greater management team credibility and financial disclosure, 
though also greater awareness of the costs of disclosure and potential for loss of competitive 




H13: The proportion of directors on the board who have a qualification in business and/or 
accounting has a positive impact on the level of mandatory disclosure.  
 
   This argument is further strengthened in the case of firm financial controllers, with 
professionally qualified controllers disclosing more and being more aware of disclosure issues 
than their unqualified counterparts (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). We therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H14: The proportion of financial controllers who have a qualification in business and/or 
accounting has a positive impact on the level of mandatory disclosure.  
 
4. Research design and data 
 
Our study data is based on the annual reports of listed firms from six GCC countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) over the period 2010 to 
2013. The motivation behind the sample period is twofold. First, the adoption of IFRS in the 
GCC region is relatively new. The majority of GCC countries mandatorily adopted IFRS in the 
early 2000s, excepting Saudi Arabia which follows national GAAP that is similar to IFRS 
effective from 2017 for non-financial firms. In order to eliminate the impact of the global 
financial crisis we focus on the period after the crisis. Second, the GCC region became more 
attractive to potential investors who are also key users of financial disclosure information, with 
average annual FDI inflows of 2.46% of GDP during the sample period, followed by a fall to 
below 2% in more recent years. Thus, there was significant focus on the region due to its 
increased openness and dynamism during the sample period. 392 annual reports are hand-
collected for non-financial listed firms. For each country, the top 20 listed firms by market 
weight index over the study period are collected, capturing 79% of GCC state total market 
capitalisation. 
   Our model dependent variable to capture the degree of mandatory disclosure is a mandatory 
disclosure index (𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋) which comprises 325 hand-collected mandatory items based on 
mandatory disclosure requirements of the 24 applicable IFRSs/IASs. We consider only 
accounting standards that are relevant and applicable to a given firm’s financial environment 
and practices during the sample period. For example, IFRS 15 (Revenue from Contracts with 
Customers) and IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments) are both excluded as they are not effective 
during the period. Likewise, IFRS 4 (Insurance Contracts) and IAS 30 (Disclosures in the 
Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions) are excluded as they apply 
only to financial firms. Further, any accounting standards which are not applicable to our 
sample firms are also eliminated such as IAS 12 (Income Tax) as firms instead pay a Zakat 
(religious tax). Table I shows the 24 applicable IASs/IFRSs included in this study, along with 
the 325 required disclosure items. 
 
[Insert Table I here] 
 
   We validate the 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 checklist by: (i) checking and confirming its completeness and 
comprehensiveness against the Big-4 firm disclosure checklists; and (ii) by engaging two 
experienced auditors who specialise in the application of IFRSs/IASs to review it. Consistent 
with Glaum and Street (2003), each disclosure requirement in the 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 is assigned an 
equal weight. Disclosure items (𝑑𝑖) listed in the 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 checklist score 1 if they are made 
by a firm and 0 if they are not. Where a disclosure item is not applicable to a firm, the item is 
omitted for that firm. The 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 for each firm is the total score of mandatory disclosures 










                                                        (1) 
 
Where: 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 = mandatory disclosure index for firm 𝑖, 0 ≤ 𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 ≤ 1; 𝑖 = number 
of firms; 𝑚 = number of applicable disclosure items; and 𝑡 = year. 
   
  We include as independent variables in our model the firm characteristics (firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, degree of international exposure, identification of firms which 
consolidate their financial statements, and firm length of establishment), ownership factors 
(institutional ownership and state ownership), corporate governance factors (board size, degree 
of board independence, role duality), cultural factors (director and financial controller 
education levels), and the level of firm voluntary disclosure. All regressions include the effects 
of industry, year, and country. Table II provides the definitions of the independent variables.  
 
[Insert Table II here] 
 
   Model I specifies the level of mandatory disclosure as a function of corporate characteristic 
factors (CCF), as detailed in Equation 2:  
 
𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
    
Model II includes Model I variables plus a dummy variable for profit-making firms, 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡, 
as well as an interaction with 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡). The dummy 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is set equal to 1 
if 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 > 0, and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of the dummy variable helps gauge the impact 
of positive 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 on the extent of mandatory disclosure as detailed in Equation 3: 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 × 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
 
Inspired by the empirical approach of Basu (1997), we develop a model to predict that the 
relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure, 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡, and firm profitability, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡, 
which depends on whether the firm is profit-making or loss-making. The level of mandatory 
disclosure is given by 𝛽0 for loss-making firms, and 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 for profit-making firms. The 
impact of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is given by 𝛽1 for loss-making firms, and 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 for profit-making firms. 
We expect a negative 𝛽1, which implies that loss-making firms tend to disclose more 
information (since 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is negative). The interaction coefficient, 𝛽3, reflects the difference 
between profit-making and loss-making firms in terms of the impact of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 on mandatory 
disclosure. We expect that the level of mandatory disclosure in profit-making firms is less than 
loss firms as managers tend to provide more detailed information to justify their operational 
losses. This would be confirmed if 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 < −𝛽1, or 𝛽3 < −2𝛽1.   
 
The above inequality is obtained as follows (𝑎 is 𝛽1, 𝑏 is 𝛽3): 
 




and profit +𝑥: (𝑎 + 𝑏) ∗ (+𝑥)  
 
For the profit impact to be less than the loss impact, we need: 
 
(𝑎 + 𝑏) ∗ 𝑥 < 𝑎 ∗ (−𝑥)    
 
i.e. b < −2𝑎  
 
Model III includes Model I variables plus an interaction between 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  and 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡), focusing on the impact of profitability on the level of mandatory disclosure in more 
liquid GCC firms, as detailed in Equation 4: 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 × 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
  (4) 
 
We predict that liquidity (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡) strengthens the relationship between the level of mandatory 
disclosure (𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡) and profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) as highly liquid firms tend to be more profitable 
and efficient in working capital, and in turn the relationship between the level of mandatory 
disclosure and profitability is strengthened. 𝛽3 reflects the interaction effect of 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 and 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 and is expected to be positive, suggesting more disclosures because managers 
will be motivated to signal their ability to create value for their shareholders and lower liquidity 
risks for creditors.  
 
Model IV includes Model I variables plus ownership, governance, and cultural factors, as 
detailed in Equation 5:  
  
𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑰𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑺𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑩𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑫𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑩𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑫𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑫𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓𝑬𝑫𝑼𝑩𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔𝑬𝑫𝑼𝑭𝑰𝑵𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽17𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖
+ 𝛽18𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
 (5) 
 
Model V includes Model IV variables plus an interaction effect (𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
focusing on the impact of board independence on the level of mandatory disclosure with firms 
influenced or controlled by governments. We predict that the relationship between board 
independence and the level of mandatory disclosure is impaired in government controlled or 
influenced firms, expecting 𝛽14 < 0. Model V is detailed in Equation 6:  
 
𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑩𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑫𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 × 𝑺𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽15𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽17𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽19𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽20𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
 




5. Results and discussion 
 
Descriptive statistics computed for the model variables are presented in Table III. 
 
[Insert Table III here] 
 
   The mean for the MD index across both firms and years is 0.732, with a range of 0.610 to 
0.890. The highest index value is for Qatar at 0.766, followed by the UAE (0.766), Kuwait 
(0.739), Oman (0.708), Bahrain (0.711) and Saudi Arabia (0.706). Firm size (total assets) has 
a mean of $4.455 billion, and varies greatly, ranging from $0.031 billion to $91.549 billion. 
Firm profitability (ROA) ranges from –26.7% to 44.9%, with a mean of 8%. Firm liquidity has 
a mean of 2.314, and ranges from 0.157 to 12.862. 50% of sample firms have some level of 
international sales. 
   71.7% of firms present consolidated financial statements. We omit auditor type as an 
explanatory variable in our models given the evident lack of variation. The length of 
establishment (firm age) ranges from 2 to 59 years, with a mean of 24 years. The degree of 
institutional ownership ranges from zero to 100%, with a mean of 61% for the whole sample. 
For state ownership the range is zero to 100%, with a mean of 26.5%. On average, firms have 
just 8.145 directors, and the proportion of independent members is 62.8%. A surprisingly high 
77.6% of sample firms have role duality. 70.1% of directors are qualified, while for financial 
controllers the proportion is higher at 72%. Finally, average voluntary disclosure is much lower 
than that for mandatory disclosure at 31.2%.  
   Table IV presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the model variables. The examination of 
coefficients between the MD Index (dependent) and explanatory variables shows that the 
strongest association is related to role duality. The correlation coefficient between the MD 
Index and duality is negative and significant at the 1% level, which provides support for 
hypothesis H12. The correlation coefficients also provide useful insights into the relationships 
between the MD Index and other variables. For example, the association between the MD Index 
and foreign ownership is positive and significant, which is expected as firms with foreign 
ownership tend to provide greater mandatory disclosure, as discussed in hypothesis H3. 
Likewise, the positive and significant correlation of 16.7% between mandatory disclosure and 
board independence indicates that firms with a higher degree of board independence disclose 
more. Whilst firm liquidity exhibits no strong link to the extent of mandatory disclosure, the 
correlation for the MD index and firm profitability is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is significantly negatively correlated with institutional 
ownership, confirming the relationship discussed in hypothesis H8. Further, Table IV shows 
that the educational level of board members and financial controllers are both significantly 
related to the level of mandatory disclosure. We find a positive but insignificant correlation by 
1% between the MD Index and board size for GCC firms, consistent with Hasan et al. (2013). 
A correlation of 5.5% in Table IV indicates that there is no significant association between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure in GCC firms. This finding is consistent with Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari (2004) who finds no such interaction for Saudi firms. 
 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 
   Table V presents the results of our five regression models. Model II finds that loss increases 
disclosure and leads GCC firms to provide more detailed information (𝛽1= − 0.428), whereas 
profit reduces mandatory disclosures (𝛽1 +  𝛽3= −0.049 < −𝛽1). These results confirm that a 
one unit increase in loss leads to a 0.428 increase in the mandatory disclosure index, whereas 
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a one unit increase in profit reduces the disclosure index by 0.049. The test results show that 
the sensitivity of mandatory disclosure to loss is almost nine times greater than to profit. This 
implies that managers of GCC firms are reluctant to disclose more in profit firms, but loss 
firms’ managers are eager to disclose more detailed information. Overall, these results provide 
support for agency and signalling theories, and for hypothesis H1 in Model II. Model III adds 
an interaction term between profitability and liquidity (𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑥 𝐿𝐼𝑄) to determine whether firms 
with both higher profitability and liquidity disclose more, and we find this interaction term is 
significantly positively related to the extent of disclosure, consistent with Ali et al. (2004) and 
Gallery et al. (2008). The result suggests that more profitable and cash generative firms 
disclose more to convey ‘good news’, to increase the security of director positions, to justify 
their compensation, and to signal their ability to maximise shareholder value. Consistent with 
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) and Al-Sammari et al. (2008), liquidity has no effect across 
the models, but strengthens the relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and 
profitability and thus there is partial support for agency and signalling theories, and for 
hypothesis H2. 
 
[Insert Table V here] 
 
   Firms with a greater proportion of international sales, a foreign market listing or with foreign 
investors disclose more across our models, providing support for signalling and capital needs 
theories, and for hypothesis H3. Our results are consistent with extant studies on international 
listing (Cooke, 1992; Amiraslani et al., 2013), international sales (Meek et al., 1995; Street and 
Gray, 2001) and foreign investors (Glaum and Street, 2003). Such international exposure 
encourages firms to convey their international credentials by improving information disclosure 
and comparability (Hope, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2006), in so doing meeting the information 
requirements of regulators and wider stakeholders (Malone et al., 1993).  
   We argue in hypothesis H4 that mandatory disclosure may not fully satisfy the information 
needs of users, thereby encouraging the firm’s management to provide further voluntary 
disclosure to fully communicate with them (Graham et al., 2005). As expected, firms providing 
greater voluntary disclosure also provide more mandatory disclosure across the models, 
thereby supporting hypothesis H4. This finding implies that mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure complement each other, and are therefore equally important for GCC firms, 
consistent with the findings of Naser et al. (2003) and Ball et al. (2012). Firms preparing 
consolidated financial statements provide greater mandatory disclosure in Model III (and 
marginally so in Model I), supporting the argument that in so doing they comply with more 
IAS and IFRS standards and providing support for hypothesis H5. 
   More established firms tend to provide more mandatory disclosure across the models 
(excepting Model II), consistent with Al-Sammari et al. (2008), and supporting hypothesis H6 
as younger firms have less developed accounting systems and this weaker regulatory 
compliance experience (Glaum and Street 2003). Further, such firms face a potential 
competitive disadvantage in disclosing more detailed strategic information. 
   The level of mandatory disclosure is significantly negatively associated with firm size across 
the models, a result which is inconsistent with studies such as Al-Shammari et al. (2008) and 
Gallery et al. (2008), providing no support for agency, signalling and political cost theories, 
and for hypothesis H7. Perhaps larger GCC country firms disclose more voluntary and less 
mandatory information.  
   Agency theory suggests that firms with outsider (widely held) ownership will disclose more 
information than firms with insider (closely held) ownership, shareholders in the latter already 
enjoying preferential information access. In Model IV and Model V, we find that greater 
institutional ownership leads to significantly lower disclosure across the models, consistent 
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with Schadewitz and Blevins (1998), and providing support for hypothesis H8. Indeed, 
institutional owners are effectively insiders in GCC countries given their board representation. 
In contrast, mandatory disclosure increases with state ownership in Model V, supporting 
agency and signalling theories, and hypothesis H9, consistent with Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 
(2007).  
   Mandatory disclosure is not related to board size in our models, and thus hypothesis H10 is 
not supported, contradicting the argument that the motivation to monitor and improve 
disclosure is reduced in larger boards which suffer from CEO dominance and may be slower 
in making urgent decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994). Our results confirm that board size in GCC 
country listed firms is not a strong driver of the extent of mandatory disclosure.   
   In Model IV, mandatory disclosure is unrelated to board independence. When we consider 
the impact of government ownership on the relationship between mandatory disclosure and 
board independence, however, we find that mandatory disclosure is negatively associated with 
independence for firms influenced or controlled by governments. Thus, lower government 
ownership tends to strengthen board independence, in turn increasing mandatory disclosure, 
consistent with Chen and Jaggi (2000) and providing support for agency theory and hypothesis 
H11b with the interaction term. In GCC countries, independence is considered a mechanism 
whereby the independent directors coerce management to meet the firm’s disclosure 
requirements (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
   There is weak evidence of a negative impact of role duality on the mandatory disclosure level 
in Model IV, thus providing weak support for agency theory and hypothesis H12, consistent 
with Gul and Leung (2004) and Lakhal (2005). Role separation improves management 
efficiency and monitoring. 
   Models IV and V show that board educational level has no effect on mandatory disclosure, 
providing no support for hypothesis H13, a result inconsistent with both Gray (1988) and 
Chiang and He (2010) who argue that better educated directors are more knowledgeable and 
disclose more but consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2002). In contrast, education is a positive 
driver for financial controllers across the models, providing support for hypothesis H14, a result 
consistent with Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) who argue that overseas professionally qualified 
accountants are better trained, more professionally aware, and will disclose more than their 




This paper aimed to determine the factors driving the extent of mandatory disclosure in GCC 
country listed firms. We find that mean mandatory disclosure across the sample is 0.732, and 
thus lower than in more developed countries. The relatively low level of mandatory disclosure 
may be explained by less developed enforcement mechanisms and external auditor monitoring 
arising from a lack of professional accounting training, salaries insufficient to attract highly 
qualified accountants, and a lack of government commitment to strong enforcement.  
    Our results show that mandatory disclosure is significantly positively affected by 
international presence, firms with group accounting standards or consolidated financial 
statements, voluntary disclosure, firm length of establishment, board independence in the 
absence of government control, and the educational level of financial controllers, while it is 
significantly negatively affected by firm size, institutional share ownership, board 
independence with strong government control, and marginally with CEO role duality. Firm 
liquidity is not a direct determinant, though profitability positively affects disclosure to a 
greater degree in more liquid firms. Our findings confirm that loss-making firms disclose more, 
and profit-making firms disclose less, and show that in the former the extent of mandatory 
disclosures are more sensitive than in the latter, implying that managers tend to disclose more 
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to justify negative performance in their business operations. Our paper has implications for 
regulators, enforcement bodies, and investors in the GCC countries. For GCCAAO regulators 
seeking to harmonise accounting standards, they provide a useful mandatory disclosure 
benchmark metric and a guide to which drivers might promote desired higher disclosure. The 
paper provides important lessons on the diffusion of financial reporting standards across and 
within developing countries, and through time. Further, lessons drawn from the GCC country 
experience will be of interest to other developing country regulators. 
   Our paper makes a number of contributions to the academic literature. First, it provides a 
comprehensive insight into the determinants of mandatory disclosure in GCC country listed 
firms. Second, our methodological approach to calculating the mandatory disclosure index may 
prove useful to stakeholders in GCC country disclosure including investors, financial analysts, 
and regulators. Our indices may be augmented by users with new mandatory disclosure items 
as they become relevant. Finally, our results promote further understanding of international 
financial reporting differences in a developing country setting.  
   Our paper has several limitations. First, in the scoring process, we only score mandatory 
disclosure items rather than the value or quality of financial information disclosed by firms, 
the latter which may be assessed differently by different users. Second, our disclosure model 
is based on an unweighted approach where we score each disclosure requirement equally, while 
a weighted approach may produce differing results. Third, our study examined only GCC firms, 
and the study could therefore be extended in future research to compare with other emerging 
and developed markets. Two further areas for future research may be identified. The 
relationship between the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure has been examined 
briefly in the study. However, this relationship may be examined in greater detail to understand 
which groups of disclosure items are complementary and why. This may provide additional 
insights for users and also for standard setters and policy makers who observe gaps in 
mandatory disclosure requirements and thus areas for improvement. Further, the focus of our 
paper was to examine the early post-financial global crises years of IFRS adoption. The use of 
more recent data would present the opportunity for observing possible changes in the drivers 
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Table I: Number of disclosure requirements for each IAS/IFRS included in the 










IFRS 3 Business Combinations 16 
IFRS 5 Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations 14 
IFRS 8 Operating Segment (replacing IAS 14 Segment Reporting) 27 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements 9 
IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements 9 
IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities 13 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement 14 
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements 42 
IAS 2 Inventories 8 
IAS 7 Statement of Cash Flows 14 
IAS 16 Property, Plant, and Equipment 15 
IAS 17 Leases 21 
IAS 18 Revenue 7 
IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates 6 
IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 2 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 9 
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 11 
IAS 28 Investments in Associates 15 
IAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures 9 
IAS 33 Earnings Per Share 9 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 14 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 13 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets 14 
IAS 40 Investment Property 14 
Total 24 standards 325  
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Firm profitability (ROA) ROA Return on assets = net income/total assets 
Positive ROA (positive net income) DROA Dummy variable where 1 = firms that have positive ROA, and 0 otherwise. 
Liquidity (Current ratio) LIQ Current ratio = current assets/current liabilities 
International listening status IL Dummy variable where 1 = firms listed on an international stock exchange, and 0 otherwise.  
International sales IS Dummy variable where 1 = firms that have international sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign shareholding (investors) FOWN Proportion of shares owned by foreigners to total number of shares issued 
Level of voluntary disclosure VD Index Total voluntary disclosure index (VDI) scores for each firm for each year, based on the latest information 
released by GCC country non-financial listed firms in their annual reports. The voluntary disclosure checklist 
contains 129 items, based on 13 main groups including general information,  financial overview and historical 
information, ratios and other analyses, projected and management information, market-based information, 
future prospects, acquisitions and disposals, research and development, information about directors, 
employee information, social policy and value-added information, segmental information, and finally foreign 
currency information. The index computation applied a dichotomous approach (Cooke 1992), with details 
available from the authors on request. 
Consolidated financial statement firms CFS Dummy variable where 1 = firms that have consolidated financial statements, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age AGE Natural log of firm age = length of establishment in years. 
Firm size SIZE Natural log of the firm total assets at the reporting date (in US Dollars). 
Institutional control ownership IOWN Dummy variable where 1 = firm institutional ownership is greater than or equal to 20%, and 0 otherwise. 
State (government) control ownership SOWN Dummy variable where 1 = firm state ownership is greater than or equal to 20%, and 0 otherwise. 
Board size BOARDS Natural log of number of company board directors on the firm’s board. 
Board independence BOARDIND Ratio of independent non-executive directors to total number of board directors. 
Role duality DUALITY Dummy variable where 1 = CEO serves as Chairman, and 0 otherwise. 
Education level of board of directors EDUBOARD Ratio of directors qualified in business or accounting to total number of directors 
Education level of financial controllers EDUFIN Ratio of financial controllers qualified in business or accounting to total number of financial controllers. 
Industry effects Industry dummy Energy industry firm dummy where 1 = energy industry firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Manufacturing industry firm dummy where 1 = manufacturing firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Service industry firm dummy is the reference. 
Year effects 2010-2013 Year dummy variable where 1 = a given year, and 0 otherwise. 2013 is the reference year. 
Country effects GCC countries Year dummy variable where 1 = a given year, and 0 otherwise. Saudi Arabia is the reference country. 
Note: The independent variables are collected from firm annual reports or the respective GCC country stock exchanges. All data relate to financial year-ends.
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Table III: Descriptive statistics for the model variables across GCC member state firms 




MD index 0.732 0.730 0.057 0.610 0.890 
Firm profitability (ROA) 0.080 0.071 0.075 -0.267 0.449 
Liquidity 2.314 1.538 2.032 0.157 12.862 
International listing 0.051 0.000 0.220 0.000 1.000 
International sales  0.500 0.500 0.501 0.000 1.000 
Foreign shareholding  0.035 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.480 
VD Index 0.312 0.310 0.150 0.090 0.680 
Consolidated fin. statements (group) 0.717 1.000 0.451 0.000 1.000 
Firm age (log) 2.958 3.135 0.731 0.693 4.078 
Firm age (years) 24.000 23.000 13.905 2.000 59.000 
Firm size (log) 20.577 20.530 1.825 17.248 25.240 
Firm size ($ billion) 4.455 0.823 11.751 0.031 91.549 
Institutional control ownership 0.610 1.000 0.488 0.000 1.000 
State control ownership 0.265 0.000 0.442 0.000 1.000 
Board size (log) 2.071 2.079 0.228 1.609 2.833 
Board size (number of directors) 8.145 8.000 1.895 5.000 17.000 
Board Independence 0.628 0.636 0.229 0.000 1.000 
Role duality 0.776 1.000 0.418 0.000 1.000 
Education - board of directors 0.701 0.714 0.096 0.500 1.000 




Table IV: (Pearson) Correlation matrix for the model variables 
N=392 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. ROA -0.125** 
              
  
2. LIQ -0.042  0.182*** 
             
  
3. IL  0.077 -0.038 -0.153*** 
            
  
4. IS  0.077 -0.001 -0.133***  0.046 
           
  
5. FOWN  0.107**  0.094* -0.088* -0.075 -0.018 
          
  
6. VD Index  0.055  0.110** -0.190***  0.176*** -0.043  0.140*** 
         
  
7. CFS  0.247***  -0.081 -0.103**  0.043  0.232*** -0.184***  0.060 
        
  
8. AGE -0.067   0.198***  0.176*** -0.043  0.088* -0.042 -0.144*** -0.015 
       
  
9. SIZE  0.044  -0.124** -0.235***  0.252*** -0.066 -0.101**  0.501***  0.266*** -0.195*** 
      
  
10. IOWN -0.149***  -0.109**  0.046  0.043 -0.131***  0.145*** -0.139*** -0.224*** -0.081 -0.278*** 
     
  
11. SOWN -0.025   0.020 -0.139***  0.176***  0.000 -0.167***  0.263***  0.172***  0.042  0.380*** -0.277*** 
    
  
12. BOARDS  0.010   0.025 -0.095*  0.050 -0.090*  0.270***  0.374***  0.001  0.107**  0.318*** -0.067  0.147*** 
   
  
13. BOARDIND  0.167***  -0.078  0.011  0.127**  0.158  0.036 -0.154*** -0.009 -0.047 -0.099**  0.074  0.090* -0.056 
  
  
14. DUALITY -0.256***   0.098*  0.110** -0.098* -0.196***  0.058  0.141*** -0.284***  0.261***  0.058 -0.080 -0.009  0.230*** -0.366*** 
 
  
15. EDUBOARD  0.212***  -0.085*  0.010  0.093*  0.089*  0.024 -0.145***  0.103** -0.053 -0.142***  0.214***  0.155*** -0.197***  0.388*** -0.331***   
16. EDUFIN  0.483***  -0.126** -0.025 -0.052 -0.076  0.010  0.064  0.214*** -0.125**  0.125** -0.005 -0.126**  0.123**  0.121** -0.140*** 0.131*** 
MD Index (dependent) is represented by 0 in the above table. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
  ** Significant at the 5% level. 






Table V: The mandatory disclosure models 
Variables \ Models H S                  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 






-0.041 (-1.318) -0.428*** (-4.745) -0.142*** (-2.979) -0.035 (-1.374)  0.005 (0.188) 
DROA 
 
  0.041*** (2.712) 
 
DROA X ROA  0.379*** (4.173) 
LIQ 
H2 + 
  0.001 (0.909)  0.001 (1.044)  -0.002 (1.474)   0.001 (0.693)  0.000 (0.205) 







 -0.001 (-0.137)  0.002 (0.190) -0.000 (-0.030)  0.019  (1.599)  0.024*** (2.638) 
IS   0.010** (1.989)  0.011** (2.207)  0.011** (2.287)  0.010** (2.282)  0.011*** (2.588) 
FOWN   0.100** (2.381)  0.096** (2.265)  0.106** (2.503)  0.091** (1.981)  0.087* (1.884) 
VD Index H4 +   0.130*** (5.110)  0.125*** (4.766)  0.127*** (5.014)  0.100*** (3.876)  0.090*** (3.638) 
CFS H5 +   0.012* (1.874)  0.006 (0.856)  0.014** (2.138)  0.005 (0.970)  0.000 (0.063) 
AGE H6 +   0.008** (2.177)  0.006 (1.557)  0.008** (2.386)  0.011*** (3.805)  0.012*** (4.200) 
SIZE H7 +  -0.006*** (-2.598) -0.005** (-2.378) -0.006*** (-3.082)  -0.006*** (-2.712) -0.006*** (-2.927) 
Ownership, governance and 
cultural factors 
IOWN H8 - 
 
 -0.013*** (-2.880) -0.010** (-2.432) 
SOWN H9 - - 0.007 (-1.232) 0.091*** (6.792) 
BOARDS H10 + -0.016 (-1.561) -0.013 (-1.325) 
BOARDIND 
H11 
+   0.006 (0.474)  0.033*** (2.577) 
BOARDIND X SOWN -   -0.146*** (-7.484) 
DUALITY H12 -  -0.012* (-1.746)  -0.008 (-1.187) 
EDUBOARD H13 +   -0.011 (-0.344)  -0.015 (-0.460) 
EDUFIN H14 +    0.291*** (7.557)  0.292*** (7.328) 
Fixed effects        
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Country effects                  yes yes  yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.347 0.346 0.470 0.519 
VIF  < 4  < 6  
No. of observations  392  392  392  392  392 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
Note: H represents the relevant hypothesis, and S is the expected sign. The industry sector dummies included are manufacturing and energy sectors, and the service industry sector is excluded as 
the reference dummy. The country dummies included are UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, and Saudi Arabia is excluded as the reference dummy. The White test for heteroskedasticity 
has been performed. Heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The robust standard errors are based on HC0 – covariance estimator (SPSS GLM Univariate – 
supported by robustness checks with the Huber White correction using STATA). The Wald-test results show that ρ-value is significant at the 1% level across the models. Multicollinearity is not 
a concern as the variance inflation factor (VIF) values in main predictor variables are less than 10. 
